如何设计引导性机制来提升企业活跃度和激活排污权二级交易市场成为政府亟须解决的重要问题。该研究基于交易优惠得利这一正强化措施给出了3种不同引导性机制,构建了不同引导性机制对应的演化博弈模型和考虑存量异质性刻画市场网络结构的两种复杂网络模型,运用复杂网络演化博弈方法,以浙江省排污权二级交易市场为例研究了排污权二级交易市场引导性机制优化问题。研究发现：①BA（barabási-albert）无标度网络结构下的排污权二级交易市场运行状态优于WS（watts-strogatz）小世界网络结构下的排污权二级交易市场运行状态。②BA无标度网络结构下,排污权二级交易市场的最优引导性机制是动态的,会随着交易优惠得利系数的变化而变化。当交易优惠得利系数较低时,最优引导性机制是对存量富余企业和存量不足企业同时实施引导性机制;当交易优惠得利系数增大到一定程度时,最优引导性机制转变为对存量不足企业实施引导性机制。③排污权二级交易市场最优引导性机制的转变过程体现了市场运行由供给市场推动需求市场阶段向由需求市场拉动供给市场阶段的过渡。基于此提出：①政府要及时动态调整排污权二级交易市场引导性机制的作用强度和作用对象,并确保两者相匹配。②政府要注重市场结构的搭建,梳理并明确市场主体间的结构关系以及关系不均匀程度,进而借助大数据技术提供有针对性的交易服务,系统调控排污权二级交易市场的有效运行。③政府要关注引导性机制的实施效果,平衡其干预力度和市场发挥作用强度,协同实现有效市场和有为政府。该研究拓展了排污权交易的相关研究,为排污权二级交易市场有效运行和环境治理的精准施策提供指导。
In the context of “continuing to fight the tough battle of pollution prevention and achieving synergy between pollution reduc-tion and carbon control,” the design of guiding mechanisms to enhance corporate participation and activate the secondary emissions trading market has become an urgent issue that the government needs to address. Based on trading preferential profit as a form of posi-tive reinforcement, this study proposed three alternative guiding mechanisms, developed corresponding evolutionary game models, and constructed two complex-network models considering stock heterogeneity to describe market network structure. Using the Zhejiang sec-ondary emissions trading market as a case study, the study examined the optimization of its guiding mechanisms through a complex-net-work evolutionary game method. The study showed that: ① The secondary emissions trading market performed better under a BA (Bar-abási-Albert) scale-free network than under a WS (Watts-Strogatz) small-world network. ② Under the BA scale-free network structure, the optimal guiding mechanism was dynamic and varied with the trading preferential profit coefficient. When the coefficient was low, the optimal guiding mechanism targeted both enterprises with surplus stock and those with insufficient stock, whereas when the coeffi-cient increased beyond a threshold, the optimal guiding mechanism shifted to targeting only enterprises with insufficient stock. ③ This shift reflected a transition in market dynamics from the stage of the supply market pushing the demand market to the stage of the de-mand market pulling the supply market. Based on the above conclusions, this study proposes the following recommendations: ① The government should timely and dynamically adjust the intensity and the target groups of the guiding mechanism in the secondary emis-sions trading market and ensure their alignment. ② The government should pay attention to the construction of market structure by clar-ifying structural relationships between market participants and their degree of unevenness, and leverage big data technologies to provide targeted trading services and systematically regulate the effective operation of the secondary emissions trading market. ③ The govern-ment should focus on implementation effects of the guiding mechanism and balance intervention intensity with the market's role to achieve coordination between an effective market and a promising government. This study expands the relevant research on emissions trading and provides guidance for the effective operation of the secondary emission trading market and for the targeted implementation of environmental governance policies.
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