International cooperation, especially among major economies, is essential for effectively addressing climate change. This study developed a two-sector (green and non-green production sectors) global dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, in-corporating China, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU). Using macroeconomic and carbon emission data, the study conducted Bayesian estimation and calibration to simulate the impacts of both neutral and green technology shocks on the economic-en-vironmental system. The analysis focused on the transmission mechanisms of demand-side and supply-side adjustments under China's carbon tax policy scenario. Additionally, it employed a tripartite game theory model to explore optimal policy choices under internation-al carbon tax coordination constraints. The findings showed that: ① Neutral technology shocks intensified the “growth-emission” dilem-ma by expanding capital in the non-green sector, while green technology shocks overcame carbon lock-in through investment multipli-ers, fostering low-carbon economic growth. ② Under China's unilateral carbon tax scenario, China's domestic output contracted. De-mand-side subsidies marginally improved social welfare but led to higher carbon emissions. In contrast, supply-side subsidies enhanced green capacity through bidirectional cost adjustments, though they reduced household welfare across all three economies. However, when combined with green technological innovation, supply-side subsidies could create a win-win scenario, driving both economic growth and emission reductions. ③ In the tripartite carbon-tax game, the introduction of demand-side subsidies resulted in an equilibri-um with a carbon tax rate of 9.5% for China, and 11.5% for both the US and the EU, balancing emission reductions and welfare growth. Non-earmarked production subsidies for the green sector induced a “zero-tax-rate” prisoner's dilemma. However, earmarking produc-tion subsidies for green technology innovation fostered a new equilibrium with competitive cooperation (9.5% for China and the US, 10.5% for the EU), achieving both output and welfare growth while reducing carbon emissions. Based on these findings, this study rec-ommends: ① establishing a differentiated carbon-tax rate coordination mechanism tailored to the distinct realities of green industries in China, the US, and the EU; ② optimizing carbon-subsidy allocation by ensuring a fair transition with demand-side subsidies while driv-ing the growth-emission reduction cycle through supply-side subsidies, and ③ shifting international governance towards competitive co-operation—coordinating tax rates in the short term, sharing technologies in the medium term, and constructing a global carbon pricing mechanism in the long term—to achieve a dynamic balance between climate governance and economic growth.
WEI Weixian
,
WANG Wei
. Optimal policy choices for international cooperation on climate change: a comprehensive study based on a global DSGE model and game theory[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2026
, 36(3)
: 1
-13
.
DOI: 10.12062/cpre.20251007
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